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Market discipline is the third pillar of Basel Accord. In this paper we define 
market discipline as the mechanism via which bank stakeholders including depositors, 
shareholders,creditors,counterparty and so forth monitor and discipline excessive 
risk-taking behavior of banks by price-based or quantity-based approach with the help 
of information disclosure and accounting firms, auditing firms,credit rating agencies 
and investment consulting company.Based on the previous research, this paper carries 
out systematic theoretical and empirical research into market discipline and 
risk-taking behavior of commercial banks aiming to fill the gaps in existing research 
and provide valuable guidance for the practice. 
Based on the fully literature review, this paper unfolds the research into market 
discipline under the logic of “how to influence risk-taking behavior of commercial 
banks” and analyze the impact of related factors such as deposit insurance on market 
discipline.After defining market discipline clearly and summarizing the operational 
mechanism of market discipline and the relationship between market discipline and 
the supervisory review, this paper focuses on the study of how to influence risk-taking 
behavior of commercial banks. Firstly, this paper analyzes the relationship between 
information disclosure and risk-taking behavior of banks through the manner of 
mathematical modeling and positive modeling and draw a conclusion that information 
discipline can reduce the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks.Second, we 
analyze the effectiveness of market discipline of (quantity-effect and price-effect) by 
major banks stakeholders (depositors, shareholders and subordinated notes holders) 
comparatively.Simultaneously,the pepar empirical study the effectiveness mechanism 
of subordinated debts as an incentive mechanism of market discipline based on the 
data of subordinated debts of commercial banks in China. The study found that the 
discipline mechanism of subordinated bonds of commercial banks in China is 
effective. 
By extending Gropp-Vesala model, this paper also examined the factors affecting 
the effect of market discipline, including deposit insurance system, "too big to fail 
(TBTF)" and bank systemic risk on the influnce of market discipline.Taking into 















interactive relationship of three pillars of the Basel II:capital requirement, supervisory 
review and market disciplne.Research suggest that if the capital adequacy requirement 
is considered as a closure threshold, market discipline(the third pillar) can be used to 
reduce this closure threshold and supervisors can modulate the intensity of their 
intervention according to reliable signals given by market(indirect market 
discipline).Finally, according to previous studies combined with Chinese situation, put 
forward policy recommendations to improve the level of China's market discipline. 
The academic contribution of this paper can be expressed as follow. Firstly, this 
paper is the first attempt to carry out systematic research into bank market discipline,, 
the conclusion of this paper can be seen as the basic analytical framework for the 
follow-up research. Secondly, this paper carries out theoretical and empirical research 
into market discipline of information discipline and bank stakeholders on risk-taking 
behavior of commercial banks and these can provide scientific guidance for the 
practice. Thirdly, we study the impact of deposit insurance system and bank systemic 
risk on market discipline and to propose that China should implement the transition 
from implicit insurance system to explicit deposit insurance system. Finally, based on 
the respective roles of the three pillars of Basel II, we analyze the interaction between 
three pillars of the Basel II and provide a theoretical interpretation of coordination of 
the Basel II banking supervision concept. 
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